After LOGIN_MAX_FAILURES consecutive failed attempts from the same source IP within LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS, POST /api/v1/auth/token returns HTTP 429 with a Retry-After header for LOGIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS. A successful login resets the counter. Trusted upstream proxy IPs/CIDRs can be declared via LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS so X-Forwarded-For is honoured correctly behind nginx ingress or similar reverse proxies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
13 KiB
Implementation Plan: Login Brute-Force Protection
Branch: 009-login-rate-limiting | Date: 2026-05-06 | Spec: spec.md
Input: Feature specification from specs/009-login-rate-limiting/spec.md
Summary
Add failure-counting brute-force protection to the login endpoint (POST /api/v1/auth/token).
After a configurable number of consecutive failed attempts from the same resolved client IP,
the endpoint returns HTTP 429 with a Retry-After header for a configurable cooldown period.
A successful login resets the counter. All thresholds are configurable via environment variables.
When deployed behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Kubernetes ingress), a LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS
setting enables extraction of the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For. No new infrastructure
(no Redis, no new DB table) — counters live in process memory.
Technical Context
Language/Version: Python 3.12+
Primary Dependencies: FastAPI, pydantic-settings (already in use); no new dependencies added
Storage: In-memory dict (no persistence across restarts — intentional)
Testing: pytest + pytest-asyncio (existing test infrastructure)
Target Platform: Linux server (Docker)
Project Type: Web service (API only — this feature has no UI surface)
Performance Goals: Rate limiter adds negligible overhead (dict lookup + lock acquisition; sub-millisecond)
Constraints: Must not add new runtime service dependencies; must not change any auth behaviour for non-blocked sources
Scale/Scope: Single process, single user; in-memory store is sufficient
Constitution Check
| Principle | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| §2.4 Auth abstraction (AuthProvider interface) | ✅ Pass | Rate limiter is a guard before JWTAuthProvider.verify_credentials(), not a bypass of the interface |
| §2.5 DB abstraction (repository layer) | ✅ Pass | No database access; in-memory only |
| §2.6 No speculative abstraction | ✅ Pass | Concrete LoginRateLimiter class, no interface; only one implementation planned |
§3.3 Error envelope (detail + code) |
✅ Pass | 429 response uses {"detail": "...", "code": "login_rate_limited"} |
| §5.1 TDD | ✅ Required | Tasks follow red → green order |
| §5.2 Integration tests against PostgreSQL | ✅ Pass | Integration test for the login endpoint will run against the Docker PostgreSQL stack |
| §7.2 Environment configuration | ✅ Pass | LOGIN_MAX_FAILURES, LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS, LOGIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS, LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS from env vars |
| §7.3 Linting (ruff) | ✅ Required | All new files must pass ruff check |
Gate result: No violations. Cleared to proceed.
Project Structure
Documentation (this feature)
specs/009-login-rate-limiting/
├── plan.md ← this file
├── research.md ← decisions on approach
├── data-model.md ← rate-limit record entity
├── quickstart.md ← curl runbook
├── contracts/
│ └── auth.md ← updated POST /api/v1/auth/token with 429
└── tasks.md ← generated by /speckit-tasks
Source Code Changes
api/
├── app/
│ ├── auth/
│ │ ├── rate_limiter.py ← NEW: LoginRateLimiter class
│ │ ├── jwt_provider.py (unchanged)
│ │ ├── noop.py (unchanged)
│ │ └── provider.py (unchanged)
│ ├── config.py ← add login_max_failures, login_window_seconds, login_cooldown_seconds, login_trusted_proxy_ips
│ ├── main.py ← init LoginRateLimiter in lifespan, attach to app.state
│ └── routers/
│ └── auth.py ← check rate limit before auth, record outcome
└── tests/
├── unit/
│ └── test_rate_limiter.py ← NEW: unit tests for LoginRateLimiter logic
└── integration/
└── test_login_rate_limit.py ← NEW: integration tests for 429 behaviour via HTTP
Implementation Detail
api/app/auth/rate_limiter.py
import ipaddress
import logging
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from ipaddress import IPv4Network, IPv6Network
from threading import Lock
from starlette.requests import Request
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def get_client_ip(
request: Request,
trusted_networks: list[IPv4Network | IPv6Network],
) -> str:
"""Return the resolved client IP, honouring X-Forwarded-For when the
TCP peer is a trusted upstream proxy. Falls back to the TCP peer address
when no trusted networks are configured or the peer is not in the list."""
peer = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
if trusted_networks and peer != "unknown":
try:
peer_addr = ipaddress.ip_address(peer)
if any(peer_addr in net for net in trusted_networks):
xff = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", "").split(",")[0].strip()
if xff:
return xff
real_ip = request.headers.get("X-Real-IP", "").strip()
if real_ip:
return real_ip
except ValueError:
pass
return peer
@dataclass
class _Record:
failures: int = 0
window_start: float = field(default_factory=time.time)
blocked_until: float = 0.0
class LoginRateLimiter:
def __init__(
self,
max_failures: int = 5,
window_seconds: int = 300,
cooldown_seconds: int = 900,
) -> None:
self._max = max_failures
self._window = window_seconds
self._cooldown = cooldown_seconds
self._store: dict[str, _Record] = {}
self._lock = Lock()
@property
def cooldown_seconds(self) -> int:
return self._cooldown
def is_blocked(self, ip: str) -> bool:
now = time.time()
with self._lock:
rec = self._store.get(ip)
if rec is None:
return False
if rec.blocked_until > now:
return True
if rec.blocked_until > 0:
del self._store[ip]
return False
def record_failure(self, ip: str) -> None:
now = time.time()
with self._lock:
rec = self._store.get(ip)
if rec is None:
rec = _Record(window_start=now)
self._store[ip] = rec
if now - rec.window_start > self._window:
rec.failures = 0
rec.window_start = now
rec.failures += 1
if rec.failures >= self._max:
rec.blocked_until = now + self._cooldown
logger.warning(
"Login blocked for %s after %d failures", ip, rec.failures
)
def record_success(self, ip: str) -> None:
with self._lock:
self._store.pop(ip, None)
api/app/config.py additions
login_max_failures: int = 5
login_window_seconds: int = 300
login_cooldown_seconds: int = 900
login_trusted_proxy_ips: str = "" # comma-separated IPs/CIDRs; empty = disabled
api/app/main.py lifespan update
import ipaddress
from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter
@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(application: FastAPI):
settings = get_settings()
application.state.login_rate_limiter = LoginRateLimiter(
max_failures=settings.login_max_failures,
window_seconds=settings.login_window_seconds,
cooldown_seconds=settings.login_cooldown_seconds,
)
trusted_networks = []
for part in settings.login_trusted_proxy_ips.split(","):
part = part.strip()
if part:
try:
trusted_networks.append(ipaddress.ip_network(part, strict=False))
except ValueError:
pass # invalid entry — skip silently
application.state.login_trusted_networks = trusted_networks
# ... existing DB setup unchanged
engine = get_engine()
async with engine.begin() as conn:
await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
yield
await engine.dispose()
api/app/routers/auth.py update
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from pydantic import BaseModel
from app.auth.jwt_provider import JWTAuthProvider
from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter, get_client_ip
from app.dependencies import get_jwt_auth
router = APIRouter(tags=["auth"])
class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
username: str
password: str
class TokenResponse(BaseModel):
access_token: str
token_type: str = "bearer"
expires_in: int
@router.post("/auth/token", response_model=TokenResponse)
async def login(
request: Request,
body: LoginRequest,
auth: JWTAuthProvider = Depends(get_jwt_auth),
):
limiter: LoginRateLimiter = request.app.state.login_rate_limiter
ip: str = get_client_ip(request, request.app.state.login_trusted_networks)
if limiter.is_blocked(ip):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=429,
content={
"detail": "Too many failed login attempts. Please try again later.",
"code": "login_rate_limited",
},
headers={"Retry-After": str(limiter.cooldown_seconds)},
)
if not auth.verify_credentials(body.username, body.password):
limiter.record_failure(ip)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=401,
detail={"detail": "Invalid credentials", "code": "invalid_credentials"},
)
limiter.record_success(ip)
token = auth.create_token()
return TokenResponse(
access_token=token,
token_type="bearer",
expires_in=auth._expiry_seconds,
)
api/tests/unit/test_rate_limiter.py (representative cases)
import time
import pytest
from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter
def test_not_blocked_initially():
limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
assert limiter.is_blocked("1.2.3.4") is False
def test_blocked_after_threshold():
limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
for _ in range(3):
limiter.record_failure("1.2.3.4")
assert limiter.is_blocked("1.2.3.4") is True
def test_success_clears_failures():
limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
limiter.record_failure("1.2.3.4")
limiter.record_failure("1.2.3.4")
limiter.record_success("1.2.3.4")
assert limiter.is_blocked("1.2.3.4") is False
def test_ips_are_isolated():
limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=2, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
limiter.record_failure("1.1.1.1")
limiter.record_failure("1.1.1.1")
assert limiter.is_blocked("2.2.2.2") is False
api/tests/integration/test_login_rate_limit.py (representative cases)
import pytest
from httpx import AsyncClient
# Uses the 'client' fixture (NoOpAuthProvider) from conftest — sufficient for this
# endpoint since we're testing the rate-limit layer, not auth correctness.
# The login endpoint instantiates its own limiter via app.state, so we need
# the full ASGI app.
BAD_CREDS = {"username": "attacker", "password": "wrong"}
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_repeated_failures_trigger_429(client: AsyncClient):
# Use a custom limiter with low threshold to avoid slow tests
# (the app.state.login_rate_limiter is set in lifespan; override for test)
from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter
from app.main import app
original = app.state.login_rate_limiter
app.state.login_rate_limiter = LoginRateLimiter(
max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=30
)
try:
for _ in range(3):
await client.post("/api/v1/auth/token", json=BAD_CREDS)
resp = await client.post("/api/v1/auth/token", json=BAD_CREDS)
assert resp.status_code == 429
assert resp.json()["code"] == "login_rate_limited"
assert "Retry-After" in resp.headers
finally:
app.state.login_rate_limiter = original
Implementation Phases
Phase 1 (MVP — P1): Blocking after repeated failures
- Add
login_max_failures,login_window_seconds,login_cooldown_seconds,login_trusted_proxy_ipstoapi/app/config.py - Create
api/app/auth/rate_limiter.pywithLoginRateLimiterandget_client_ip() - Initialize rate limiter and parse trusted networks in
api/app/main.pylifespan; attach both toapp.state - Update
api/app/routers/auth.pyto resolve client IP viaget_client_ip(), then check + record outcomes - Unit tests:
api/tests/unit/test_rate_limiter.py - Integration tests:
api/tests/integration/test_login_rate_limit.py
Phase 2 (US2 — observability): Logging and response hints
Delivered as part of Phase 1 (the logger.warning(...) call and Retry-After header
are embedded in the same implementation). No separate phase needed.
Environment Variables to Add to .env.example
# Login brute-force protection
LOGIN_MAX_FAILURES=5
LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS=300
LOGIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS=900
# Comma-separated IPs/CIDRs of trusted upstream proxies (e.g. nginx ingress pod CIDR).
# Leave empty when not behind a reverse proxy.
LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=
These are optional (have defaults) so existing .env files without them continue working.