# Implementation Plan: Login Brute-Force Protection

**Branch**: `009-login-rate-limiting` | **Date**: 2026-05-06 | **Spec**: [spec.md](spec.md)  
**Input**: Feature specification from `specs/009-login-rate-limiting/spec.md`

## Summary

Add failure-counting brute-force protection to the login endpoint (`POST /api/v1/auth/token`).
After a configurable number of consecutive failed attempts from the same resolved client IP,
the endpoint returns HTTP 429 with a `Retry-After` header for a configurable cooldown period.
A successful login resets the counter. All thresholds are configurable via environment variables.
When deployed behind a reverse proxy (nginx, Kubernetes ingress), a `LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS`
setting enables extraction of the real client IP from `X-Forwarded-For`. No new infrastructure
(no Redis, no new DB table) — counters live in process memory.

---

## Technical Context

**Language/Version**: Python 3.12+  
**Primary Dependencies**: FastAPI, pydantic-settings (already in use); no new dependencies added  
**Storage**: In-memory `dict` (no persistence across restarts — intentional)  
**Testing**: pytest + pytest-asyncio (existing test infrastructure)  
**Target Platform**: Linux server (Docker)  
**Project Type**: Web service (API only — this feature has no UI surface)  
**Performance Goals**: Rate limiter adds negligible overhead (dict lookup + lock acquisition; sub-millisecond)  
**Constraints**: Must not add new runtime service dependencies; must not change any auth behaviour for non-blocked sources  
**Scale/Scope**: Single process, single user; in-memory store is sufficient

---

## Constitution Check

| Principle | Status | Notes |
|-----------|--------|-------|
| §2.4 Auth abstraction (AuthProvider interface) | ✅ Pass | Rate limiter is a guard *before* `JWTAuthProvider.verify_credentials()`, not a bypass of the interface |
| §2.5 DB abstraction (repository layer) | ✅ Pass | No database access; in-memory only |
| §2.6 No speculative abstraction | ✅ Pass | Concrete `LoginRateLimiter` class, no interface; only one implementation planned |
| §3.3 Error envelope (`detail` + `code`) | ✅ Pass | 429 response uses `{"detail": "...", "code": "login_rate_limited"}` |
| §5.1 TDD | ✅ Required | Tasks follow red → green order |
| §5.2 Integration tests against PostgreSQL | ✅ Pass | Integration test for the login endpoint will run against the Docker PostgreSQL stack |
| §7.2 Environment configuration | ✅ Pass | `LOGIN_MAX_FAILURES`, `LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS`, `LOGIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS`, `LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS` from env vars |
| §7.3 Linting (ruff) | ✅ Required | All new files must pass `ruff check` |

**Gate result**: No violations. Cleared to proceed.

---

## Project Structure

### Documentation (this feature)

```text
specs/009-login-rate-limiting/
├── plan.md              ← this file
├── research.md          ← decisions on approach
├── data-model.md        ← rate-limit record entity
├── quickstart.md        ← curl runbook
├── contracts/
│   └── auth.md          ← updated POST /api/v1/auth/token with 429
└── tasks.md             ← generated by /speckit-tasks
```

### Source Code Changes

```text
api/
├── app/
│   ├── auth/
│   │   ├── rate_limiter.py          ← NEW: LoginRateLimiter class
│   │   ├── jwt_provider.py          (unchanged)
│   │   ├── noop.py                  (unchanged)
│   │   └── provider.py              (unchanged)
│   ├── config.py                    ← add login_max_failures, login_window_seconds, login_cooldown_seconds, login_trusted_proxy_ips
│   ├── main.py                      ← init LoginRateLimiter in lifespan, attach to app.state
│   └── routers/
│       └── auth.py                  ← check rate limit before auth, record outcome
└── tests/
    ├── unit/
    │   └── test_rate_limiter.py     ← NEW: unit tests for LoginRateLimiter logic
    └── integration/
        └── test_login_rate_limit.py ← NEW: integration tests for 429 behaviour via HTTP
```

---

## Implementation Detail

### `api/app/auth/rate_limiter.py`

```python
import ipaddress
import logging
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from ipaddress import IPv4Network, IPv6Network
from threading import Lock

from starlette.requests import Request

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)


def get_client_ip(
    request: Request,
    trusted_networks: list[IPv4Network | IPv6Network],
) -> str:
    """Return the resolved client IP, honouring X-Forwarded-For when the
    TCP peer is a trusted upstream proxy. Falls back to the TCP peer address
    when no trusted networks are configured or the peer is not in the list."""
    peer = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
    if trusted_networks and peer != "unknown":
        try:
            peer_addr = ipaddress.ip_address(peer)
            if any(peer_addr in net for net in trusted_networks):
                xff = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For", "").split(",")[0].strip()
                if xff:
                    return xff
                real_ip = request.headers.get("X-Real-IP", "").strip()
                if real_ip:
                    return real_ip
        except ValueError:
            pass
    return peer


@dataclass
class _Record:
    failures: int = 0
    window_start: float = field(default_factory=time.time)
    blocked_until: float = 0.0


class LoginRateLimiter:
    def __init__(
        self,
        max_failures: int = 5,
        window_seconds: int = 300,
        cooldown_seconds: int = 900,
    ) -> None:
        self._max = max_failures
        self._window = window_seconds
        self._cooldown = cooldown_seconds
        self._store: dict[str, _Record] = {}
        self._lock = Lock()

    @property
    def cooldown_seconds(self) -> int:
        return self._cooldown

    def is_blocked(self, ip: str) -> bool:
        now = time.time()
        with self._lock:
            rec = self._store.get(ip)
            if rec is None:
                return False
            if rec.blocked_until > now:
                return True
            if rec.blocked_until > 0:
                del self._store[ip]
            return False

    def record_failure(self, ip: str) -> None:
        now = time.time()
        with self._lock:
            rec = self._store.get(ip)
            if rec is None:
                rec = _Record(window_start=now)
                self._store[ip] = rec
            if now - rec.window_start > self._window:
                rec.failures = 0
                rec.window_start = now
            rec.failures += 1
            if rec.failures >= self._max:
                rec.blocked_until = now + self._cooldown
                logger.warning(
                    "Login blocked for %s after %d failures", ip, rec.failures
                )

    def record_success(self, ip: str) -> None:
        with self._lock:
            self._store.pop(ip, None)
```

### `api/app/config.py` additions

```python
login_max_failures: int = 5
login_window_seconds: int = 300
login_cooldown_seconds: int = 900
login_trusted_proxy_ips: str = ""  # comma-separated IPs/CIDRs; empty = disabled
```

### `api/app/main.py` lifespan update

```python
import ipaddress

from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter

@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(application: FastAPI):
    settings = get_settings()
    application.state.login_rate_limiter = LoginRateLimiter(
        max_failures=settings.login_max_failures,
        window_seconds=settings.login_window_seconds,
        cooldown_seconds=settings.login_cooldown_seconds,
    )
    trusted_networks = []
    for part in settings.login_trusted_proxy_ips.split(","):
        part = part.strip()
        if part:
            try:
                trusted_networks.append(ipaddress.ip_network(part, strict=False))
            except ValueError:
                pass  # invalid entry — skip silently
    application.state.login_trusted_networks = trusted_networks
    # ... existing DB setup unchanged
    engine = get_engine()
    async with engine.begin() as conn:
        await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
    yield
    await engine.dispose()
```

### `api/app/routers/auth.py` update

```python
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from pydantic import BaseModel

from app.auth.jwt_provider import JWTAuthProvider
from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter, get_client_ip
from app.dependencies import get_jwt_auth

router = APIRouter(tags=["auth"])


class LoginRequest(BaseModel):
    username: str
    password: str


class TokenResponse(BaseModel):
    access_token: str
    token_type: str = "bearer"
    expires_in: int


@router.post("/auth/token", response_model=TokenResponse)
async def login(
    request: Request,
    body: LoginRequest,
    auth: JWTAuthProvider = Depends(get_jwt_auth),
):
    limiter: LoginRateLimiter = request.app.state.login_rate_limiter
    ip: str = get_client_ip(request, request.app.state.login_trusted_networks)

    if limiter.is_blocked(ip):
        return JSONResponse(
            status_code=429,
            content={
                "detail": "Too many failed login attempts. Please try again later.",
                "code": "login_rate_limited",
            },
            headers={"Retry-After": str(limiter.cooldown_seconds)},
        )

    if not auth.verify_credentials(body.username, body.password):
        limiter.record_failure(ip)
        raise HTTPException(
            status_code=401,
            detail={"detail": "Invalid credentials", "code": "invalid_credentials"},
        )

    limiter.record_success(ip)
    token = auth.create_token()
    return TokenResponse(
        access_token=token,
        token_type="bearer",
        expires_in=auth._expiry_seconds,
    )
```

### `api/tests/unit/test_rate_limiter.py` (representative cases)

```python
import time
import pytest
from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter


def test_not_blocked_initially():
    limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
    assert limiter.is_blocked("1.2.3.4") is False


def test_blocked_after_threshold():
    limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
    for _ in range(3):
        limiter.record_failure("1.2.3.4")
    assert limiter.is_blocked("1.2.3.4") is True


def test_success_clears_failures():
    limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
    limiter.record_failure("1.2.3.4")
    limiter.record_failure("1.2.3.4")
    limiter.record_success("1.2.3.4")
    assert limiter.is_blocked("1.2.3.4") is False


def test_ips_are_isolated():
    limiter = LoginRateLimiter(max_failures=2, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=300)
    limiter.record_failure("1.1.1.1")
    limiter.record_failure("1.1.1.1")
    assert limiter.is_blocked("2.2.2.2") is False
```

### `api/tests/integration/test_login_rate_limit.py` (representative cases)

```python
import pytest
from httpx import AsyncClient

# Uses the 'client' fixture (NoOpAuthProvider) from conftest — sufficient for this
# endpoint since we're testing the rate-limit layer, not auth correctness.
# The login endpoint instantiates its own limiter via app.state, so we need
# the full ASGI app.

BAD_CREDS = {"username": "attacker", "password": "wrong"}


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_repeated_failures_trigger_429(client: AsyncClient):
    # Use a custom limiter with low threshold to avoid slow tests
    # (the app.state.login_rate_limiter is set in lifespan; override for test)
    from app.auth.rate_limiter import LoginRateLimiter
    from app.main import app
    original = app.state.login_rate_limiter
    app.state.login_rate_limiter = LoginRateLimiter(
        max_failures=3, window_seconds=60, cooldown_seconds=30
    )
    try:
        for _ in range(3):
            await client.post("/api/v1/auth/token", json=BAD_CREDS)
        resp = await client.post("/api/v1/auth/token", json=BAD_CREDS)
        assert resp.status_code == 429
        assert resp.json()["code"] == "login_rate_limited"
        assert "Retry-After" in resp.headers
    finally:
        app.state.login_rate_limiter = original
```

---

## Implementation Phases

### Phase 1 (MVP — P1): Blocking after repeated failures

1. Add `login_max_failures`, `login_window_seconds`, `login_cooldown_seconds`, `login_trusted_proxy_ips` to `api/app/config.py`
2. Create `api/app/auth/rate_limiter.py` with `LoginRateLimiter` and `get_client_ip()`
3. Initialize rate limiter and parse trusted networks in `api/app/main.py` lifespan; attach both to `app.state`
4. Update `api/app/routers/auth.py` to resolve client IP via `get_client_ip()`, then check + record outcomes
5. Unit tests: `api/tests/unit/test_rate_limiter.py`
6. Integration tests: `api/tests/integration/test_login_rate_limit.py`

### Phase 2 (US2 — observability): Logging and response hints

Delivered as part of Phase 1 (the `logger.warning(...)` call and `Retry-After` header
are embedded in the same implementation). No separate phase needed.

---

## Environment Variables to Add to `.env.example`

```dotenv
# Login brute-force protection
LOGIN_MAX_FAILURES=5
LOGIN_WINDOW_SECONDS=300
LOGIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS=900
# Comma-separated IPs/CIDRs of trusted upstream proxies (e.g. nginx ingress pod CIDR).
# Leave empty when not behind a reverse proxy.
LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS=
```

These are optional (have defaults) so existing `.env` files without them continue working.